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This paper argues that social security enjoys wider political sup­
port than other welfare programs because: (i) retirees constitute the 
most homogeneous voting group, and (ii) the intragenerational redistri­
bution component of social security induces low-income young to support 
this system. In a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy 
with earnings heterogeneity, we show that, for sufficient income inequal­
ity and enough elderly in the population, a welfare system composed of 
a within-cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security 
system represents the political equilibrium of a two-dimensional majori- 
tarian election. Social security is sustained by a majority of retirees 
and low-income young; intragenerational redistribution by low-income 
young. Our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality af­
fect the welfare state, the income distribution should be decomposed by 
age groups.
Keywords: Social Security, Income Inequality, Subgame Perfect 
Structure Induced Equilibrium.




























































































In most industrialized countries, social security represents the single 
largest item of social welfare expenditure, and a predominant component 
in the government budget. In 1992 the US social security system gath­
ered almost 76% of all cash benefits1 in transfers to the old, as opposed 
to 15.8% to unemployment, temporary disability benefits and workers’ 
compensations and 8.2% to public assistance and supplemental security 
income (see Table 1).
Why does the largest social welfare scheme depend on the age of the 
recipients rather than on their income or wealth? And why do we observe 
so little income redistribution among individuals of the same age group? 
This paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than 
other welfare programs for two reasons. First, the recipients of social 
security benefits, the retirees, constitute a homogeneous group, capable 
of clustering a large block of votes to support this program and to oppose 
others. Second, the intragenerational redistribution component of the 
social security system makes this program palatable to low-income young 
individuals, even when alternative redistribution schemes are available.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a welfare state 
composed of a (large) social security system and a (small) income redis­
tribution scheme constitutes the politico-economic equilibrium in a se­
quence of majoritarian elections when the economy displays sufficiently 
large labor income inequality, and there are enough elderly in the popu­
lation. In this equilibrium, the social security system is supported by a 
voting majority composed of elderly and low-income young, whereas the 
income redistribution scheme only receives the votes of the low-income 
young.
It is hardly a new insight to relate the size of the welfare state to 
the degree of income inequality in the economy. Romer (1975), Roberts 
(1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggested that, in democracies,
1When also in-kind benefits are considered, the social security system still enjoys 
the largest share, 58.7%, of the Federal and State budget on all benefits excluding 



























































































more unequal income distributions induce larger redistribution policies. 
While we build on this idea, we introduce a further characterization of 
the agents, their age, to explain the contemporaneous existence of an 
income-based redistribution scheme and an age-based transfer scheme, 
the social security system.
Our analysis is motivated by two observations. First, we notice that 
a large proportion of the earning poor are indeed old individuals. Using 
1992 US data, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios Rull (1997) find that 
respectively 63% and 28% of the individuals in the first and second earn­
ings quintile are older than 65 years. We argue that these elderly voters 
may prefer an age-based to an income-based transfer scheme, therefore 
decreasing the support that income redistribution schemes are expected 
to enjoy among low-income individuals. Second, we emphasize the intra- 
generational redistribution component built in to many social security 
systems. In fact, many programs are known to redistribute both across 
and within cohorts, since contributions to the social security system are 
typically proportional to the labor income (up to a maximum), whereas 
benefits tend to be regressive. Boskin et al. (1987) and Galasso (2000) 
provide evidence supporting this view for the US. They show that, for 
a given cohort, low income families obtain larger internal rates of return 
from investing in social security than middle or high-income families. 
Like in Tabellini (1990), the existence of a within cohorts redistribution 
element in the social security system is crucial in our analysis, as social 
security becomes appealing to low-income young, even in the presence of 
other income redistribution schemes.
We use a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with 
storage technology. Young agents differ in their working ability, and 
therefore in their labor income. Old individuals do not work. The wel­
fare state consists of two programs that have balanced budgets every 
period. An (intragenerational) income redistribution scheme taxes labor 
income and awards a lump sum transfer in young age, whereas an un­
funded social security system imposes a payroll tax rate and pays a lump 
sum pension. The level of the two welfare programs, i.e., the income 




























































































dimensional majority voting game by all agents alive at every election. 
This voting game has two important characteristics. First, because of 
the multidimensionality of the issue space, the existence of a Condorcet 
winner of the majority voting game is not guaranteed. Second, if an equi­
librium exists, in absence of a commitment device over future policies, 
young voters have no incentive to support any intergenerational transfer 
scheme.
To overcome the former problem, we initially assume commitment 
over future social security policies, and concentrate on political equilib­
ria induced by institutional restrictions, or structure-induced equilibria, 
as in Shepsle (1979). In our political system, the entire electorate has 
jurisdiction over the two issues (i.e., the two tax rates), but policy deci­
sions have to be taken issue-by-issue. To deal with the latter feature of 
the game, we drop the assumption of commitment, and consider implicit 
contracts among successive generations, as Hammond (1975), and more 
recently Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), Cooley and Soares (1999), and 
Galasso (1999). To summarize, we introduce a notion of subgame perfect 
structure induced equilibrium, which combines the concept of structure 
induced equilibrium, introduced by Shepsle (1979), with the intergener­
ational implicit contract idea, originally presented by Hammond (1975).
We show that, if there is a sufficiently large proportion of elderly 
in the population and enough income inequality, then a welfare state 
composed of an income redistribution scheme and an unfunded social se­
curity system arises as the structure-induced equilibrium of the majority 
voting game. In this equilibrium, the social security system is voted by 
a majority of elderly and low-income young, whereas income redistribu­
tion only receives the support of the young voters whose labor income is 
below the average labor income in the economy.
The idea of a social security system which relies on the political 
support of low-income young and retirees dates back to Tabellini (1990). 
In his model, low-income, weakly altruistic agents vote for social secu­
rity since the utility they derive from the pension their parents receive 
outweighs the direct cost of the social security tax, and an equilibrium 




























































































this result is not robust to a more complete specification of the welfare 
state. And if an additional income redistribution scheme is introduced, 
the equilibrium disappears.
Our results are also relevant for the empirical literature on the rela­
tion between income inequality and the size of the welfare. Some studies, 
namely Tabellini (1990), Perotti (1996), Breyer and Craig (1997) and 
Lindert (1997), which have tried to establish some empirical regulari­
ties between various measures of income inequality and the size of the 
different welfare programs, have provided mixed evidence. This is consis­
tent with the implication of our model that the effect on each individual 
welfare program depends on the magnitude of the change in income in­
equality, as well as on its specific impact on the income distribution. In 
particular, we argue that empirical studies should not focus on the overall 
income distribution, or its relevant statistics. This distribution should 
rather be decomposed by age groups, whenever age, rather than labor in­
come, may represent the main component in the agents’ decisions. Only 
then should a significant statistic be obtained by reaggregated voters’ 
preferences according to age and income.
In an independent contribution, Lambertini and Azariadis (1998) 
analyze the contemporaneous existence of an intragenerational and an 
intergenerational redistribution instrument, in an alternative political 
setup that draws from Barron and Ferejohn (1989)’s legislative bargain­
ing. Together with Tabellini (1990), we all share the result that so­
cial security is supported by a voting majority of old and low-ability 
young. However, unlike us, Lambertini and Azariadis (1998) find that 
the same voting majority also supports the intragenerational redistribu­
tion program2. Therefore, their model reproduces the traditional result 
that an increase in income inequality unambiguously rises the size of both 
programs of the welfare system (see e.g., Meltzer and Richard (1981)).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
2In fact, in Lambertini and Azariadis (1998), the equilibrium intergenerational 
and intragenerational transfers represent the outcome of a bargaining process among 
three groups of agents, and thus both programs are constrained to be supported by 




























































































the economic equilibrium. Section 3 develops the political system, and 
introduces our equilibrium concept. In section 4, we characterize the 
equilibria of the voting game. In section 5 and 6, we discuss the results 
and conclude.
2 T he M od el E conom y
Consider an economy with overlapping generations and a storage tech­
nology. Every period two generations are alive, we call them “Young” 
and “Old”. Population grows at a constant rate /i > 0. It follows that 
in any given period t for every young there are 1/ (1 4- /t) old.
Agents work when young, and then retire in their old age. Con­
sumption takes place in old age only. Young individuals differ in their 
working ability. Working abilities are distributed on the support [e, e] C 
5f+, according to the cumulative distribution function G(.). An agent 
born at time t is characterized by a level of working ability and will 
therefore be denoted by et 6 [e,e]. The distribution of abilities is as­
sumed to have mean ê ,, and to be skewed, G (e#) > 1/2, which implies 
a skewed labor income distribution, according to the available data from 
every country.
A production function transforms labor into the only consumption 
good, according to the worker’s ability:
y(e t) =  etn (et) (1)
where n (et) represents the amount of labor supplied by the agent with 
ability et. A storage technology converts a unit of today’s consumption 
good into 1 +  R units of tomorrow’s good, yt + 1 =  (1 +  R) yt. Since there 
are no outside assets or fiat money, all private intertemporal transfer of 
resources takes place through the storage technology. Then by assuming 




























































































Agents value young age leisure and old age consumption3 according 
to a log-linear utility function:
U (lt,c[+l) =  ln(Zt)+ /?cj+1 (2)
where l is leisure, c is consumption, p  represents the individual discount 
factor, subscripts indicate the calendar time and superscripts indicate 
the period when the agent was born.
Young agents face the usual trade off between labor, n (et), and 
leisure, since n (et) =  1 — 1 (et), where 1 (> 0) is the total amount
of disposable time, which we assume to be equal across types. Young 
pay payroll taxes on their labor income, receive a transfer, and save 
their disposable income for old age consumption. Old agents have no 
economic decision to take as they consume their entire income. The life 
time budget constraint for an agent born at time t with ability et is then:
c[ + 1  =  [e,n (et) (1 - r t -  at) +  Ttj (1 +  R) +  Pt+1 (3)
where rt and crt are the income redistribution and the social security tax 
rates at time t , and Tt and Pt+l are respectively the young age transfer 
at time t, and the old age transfer at time t 4- 1.
Young determine their labor supply by maximizing U (lt, cj+1) with 
respect to l (e£) and subject to budget constraint (3). We assume that 
the individual discount factor is equal to the inverse of the interest factor, 
P =  1/(1 -f /?), so that the labor supply does not depend on the interest 
rate. The optimal labor supply for an ability type et agent is then:
n(e,) =  m a x { o .i—e, ( 1 _ 1r, _ g, ) } .  (4)
3The assumption that consumption only takes place in old age guarantees the 
existence of a closed-form solution, but at the cost of abstracting from saving decisions. 
Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), Cooley and Soares (1998) and Galasso (1999) discuss 




























































































We assume that the labor supply is strictly positive for every type4.
Because of the log-linearity of the utility function the labor supply 
is only affected by changes in the tax rates and not by changes in the 
transfers level. In this sense, income effects play no role, whereas taxes 
distort labor supply decisions. This largely simplifies the analysis, be­
cause it implies that today’s labor supply is not affected by tomorrow’s 
fiscal policies.
2.1 T he W elfare System
We examine two social welfare instruments, an income redistribution 
system, and a social security (or pension) system.
The former is an intragenerational redistribution scheme which only 
affects young generations. In fact, all young persons benefit from a lump 
sum transfer, Tt, which is financed through a payroll tax, r(, on the labor 
income. Clearly, this system redistributes from rich (above mean income 
types) to poor (below mean income types) young. The latter scheme 
consists of a sequence of transfers from workers to retirees. Each worker 
contributes a payroll tax rate, <r(, from her labor income, and every retiree 
receives a flat transfer, Pt. Every system is assumed to be individually 
balanced every period, so that its total expenditure has to be equal to 
the amount of collected taxed.
The budget constraint at time t for the income redistribution scheme 
is thus:
Tt =  Tt J  etn (et) dG (et) (5)
whereas the budget constraint for the social security system is
Pt =<7t ( l+ n ) j ' '  etn{et)dG(et) . (6) *1
4This assumption amounts to imposing a restriction on the tax rates: rt +  at <




























































































By substituting the labor supply in (4) into (5) and (6), we obtain 
two new expressions for the welfare system budget constraints:
Tt (rt, crt) =  n (7)
and
Pt(Tt,at) =CTt( l + n )
1
1 -  rt -  at ( 8)
The young age lump sum transfer displays a Laffer curve with respect to 
the corresponding tax rate and depends negatively on the social security 
payroll tax rate. In fact, the social security tax rate induces a distortion, 
which contributes to decrease the average income in the economy and 
thus reduces the young-age benefits. Analogously, the lump sum pension 
displays a Laffer curve with respect to the corresponding tax rate and 
depends negatively on the income redistribution tax rate.
2.2 T he E conom ic E quilibrium
The economic equilibrium can now be defined as follows
Definition 1 For a given sequence of tax rates, {rt,crt}^f0, and a given 
real interest rate, R, an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations,
{/ (et) >cl+1 (e‘)}é,6°|e ë|00 ’ such that:
• the consumer problem is solved for each generation, i.e., agents 
maximize U (it, cj+1) with respect to l (et), subject to the restriction 
in eq.3; •
• the welfare budget constraints are balanced every period, and thus 




























































































• the goods market clears every period:
J ct 1 (e(-i) dG (e(_i) —
(1 + R) J (1 — <7t-i) et-in  (et_i) dG (ej-i) +  (9)
<rt (l + n ) [  etn (et) dG (et) .
The utility level obtained in an economic equilibrium at time t by 
an ability type ee young and by an ability type old agent can be 
expressed by their indirect utility functions. For the young:
v\ (Tt,crt,Tt+i a t+i,e t) =  -lnej -  1 -  ln(l -  rt -  at) +  et7(l -  rt -  ot)
+ T t + <7t+1
1 4* /i 
1 -(- R. e4>,t+ll-
1
1 — Tt+1 — rr(+1
(10)
For the old:
1(rt, <rt, et-\)  =  K  (et- i)  +  at 1 /i1 + R ( i i)
where K  (e(_i) is a constant5 which depends on the agent’s type, but not 
on current or future tax rates.
These indirect utility functions characterize the young and old agents’ 
preference relations over current (and future) tax rates. Notice that the 
old individuals’ ability type scales their utility up or down, but does not 
affect their preferences over the tax rates. In other words, all old agents, 
regardless of their ability type, share the same preferences over welfare 
programs.




























































































3 T he V oting  G am e
The amount of welfare expenditures, i.e., income redistribution and so­
cial security, is decided through a political process which aggregates the 
agents’ preferences over the two tax rates. We consider a political regime 
of majority voting. Elections take place every period, and voters are all 
agents alive. At every election voters cast their ballots on the two cur­
rent tax rates, rt and at . However, since every agent has zero mass, no 
individual voter would affect the outcome of the election, and thus any 
individual voting strategy would be part of an equilibrium. To overcome 
this problem, we assume sincere voting.
This majority voting game displays two important features. First, 
due to the two-dimensionality of the issue space, (r, cr), a Condorcet 
winner of the majority voting game may fail to exist. Second, if an 
equilibrium exists, would a majority of young (and old) individuals agree 
to transfer resources to current retirees when there is no guarantee that 
such policy will be carried on in the next periods? To deal with these 
two characteristics of the game, we introduce an equilibrium concept 
which applies the notion of subgame perfection to the concept of structure 
induced equilibrium, which was originally proposed by Shepsle (1979). 
In the remaining of this section, we discuss how our equilibrium concept 
allows us to successfully tackle these two issues. Section 3.1 and 3.2 
provide a formal treatment.
To concentrate on the non-existence of Nash equilibria, we initially 
assume full commitment over the social security tax rate. Today’s voters 
determine the current and future social security tax rates, however, they 
only set the current income redistribution tax rate6. The assumption 
of commitment effectively reduces the voting game to a static one, in 
which we can analyze how the two-dimensionality of the issue space may
6We choose to limit commitment to the social security policy only, because, due 
to its intergenerational nature, this is the only policy in which commitment can be 
achieved as an implicit contract among successive generations of voters. We will 




























































































prevent a Nash equilibrium from arising7. The following example will 
illustrate this point.
Figure 1 displays the preferences of three representative voters, old, 
rich young, and poor young, as utility contours in the two-dimensional 
issue space8, (r ,cr). Old voters clearly support a social security scheme, 
and oppose any income redistribution system, r, which decreases the 
average income in the economy and does not award them any benefits. 
The pair of tax rates which maximizes their indirect utility (eq. 11), 
i.e., their bliss point, is thus (r, cr) =  (0,cr*w > 0); and their indifference 
contours are represented by the dashed curves. Rich young voters, i.e., 
voters whose income is above the mean income in the economy, dislike 
both welfare schemes, to which they are net contributors. Their bliss 
point is the origin, (r, cr) =  (0,0); and their indifference contours are 
the dotted lines. A poor young, e.g., a young with ability e, on the 
other hand, is a net recipient from both schemes. If she maximizes her 
indirect utility function with respect to the current tax rates, and under 
the assumptions that the decision of current social security tax rate binds 
the future tax rate, <x( =  crt+1 , whereas the current income redistribution 
tax rate has no impact on future policies, her bliss point9 is (r, cr) =  
(r*p > 0, <7*p =  o ) . The poor young prefers to obtain her entire welfare 
transfer through the income redistribution benefit. Her preferences are 
represented by the continuous-line contours.
If these three agents were the only voters and had equal weights, no 
Nash equilibrium of the majority voting game would exist, and Condorcet 
cycles would arise. For example, in Figure 1, point b would be preferred 
to point a by the poor young and the old; c would be preferred to b by 
the old and the rich young; and finally rich and poor young would close 
the cycle moving from c to a. The same result would apply to the voting 
game played by the entire electorate, unless a median in all directions
7See Ordershook (1986) for an extensive review of these issues.
®Young voters’ preferences are depicted under the assumption that both tax rates 
remain constant over time: rt =  r(+i, and at = <r(+
9The condition for the bliss point to occur at cr — 0 is that (ê , t — e) <





























































































To overcome this well-known problem, we follow Shepsle (1979) 
in analyzing voting equilibria induced by institutional restrictions, i.e., 
structure-induced equilibria. In section 3.1, we discuss the set of institu­
tional restrictions, which are needed to convert our two-dimensional elec­
tion into a simultaneous issue-by-issue voting game, in which a (structure 
induced) equilibrium exists.
Suppose now that the assumption of commitment over future so­
cial security policies is dropped, would the young be willing to support a 
social security system? If young agents expect their voting behavior to 
have no relevance for future choices, they should vote for a zero social 
security tax rate, or else they would incur in a current labor tax with 
no future benefits. However, current electors may expect their voting 
decisions to have an impact on future policies. In this case, as Hammond 
(1975) initially suggested, an implicit contract among successive genera­
tions of voters may arise, in which today’s young agree on a transfer to 
current retirees because they expect to be rewarded with a corresponding 
transfer in their old age. A failure to comply with the implicit contract 
is punished with no old age transfers.
In section 3.2, we follow this route. We drop the assumption of 
commitment over future social security policies, and we analyze the vot­
ing strategies, which are compatible with the arise and the sustainability 
of an implicit contract. Formally, we introduce a notion of (subgame per­
fect) equilibrium which requires subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes 
of the voting game without commitment to be structure induced equilib­
rium outcomes of the voting game with commitment.
To summarize, our notion of equilibrium applies the idea of sub­
game perfection to the concept of structure induced equilibrium, in the 
context of a dynamic, two-dimensional voting game. First, we study the 
structure induced equilibria of the two-dimensional voting game with 
commitment. Then, we replace the commitment device with an implicit 
contract, to analyze which structure induced equilibrium outcomes of the




























































































game with commitment are also subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes 
of the game without commitment. A formal definition of our equilibrium 
notion, which we call subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium (SP- 
SIE), is given in section 3.2.
3.1 Structure-Induced Equilibria
An institutional arrangement characterizes how the political system ag­
gregates the individual preferences over the alternatives into a political 
outcome (t*,ct*). The space of alternatives, or issues, is (r, a) € R2 sub­
ject to r + a  < 1 — 1/Ze, which we imposed in order for the labor supply of 
any young agent to be positive (see footnote 3). Individual preferences 
over the alternatives are derived from the indirect utility functions at 
equations 10 and 11. We assume that there exists perfect commitment 
over the social security policy, whereas no commitment is available on 
the income redistribution policy.
An arrangement is composed of a committee system, a jurisdictional 
arrangement, an assignment rule, and an amendment control rule. The 
committee system separates the electorate, E, in committees {C j}. The 
jurisdictional arrangement, J, divides the issues (r, er) into jurisdictions 
{Jjt}. Jurisdictions are then associated to committees, according to an 
assignment rule, /  : Cj —> J*,. In this way, the political system assigns 
the decision over a subset of the issue space, e.g., a single issue, to a 
particular committee. Every committee is entitled to make a proposal to 
change the current value of the issue (the status quo) which falls into its 
jurisdiction. The amendment control rule determines how proposals can 
be further modified (amended) by the electorate before the final stage is 
reached, and the (possibly amended) proposal is then voted in a majority 
rule, pairwise comparison against the status quo by the entire electorate.
As originally proposed by Shepsle (1979), this institutional arrange­
ment does not directly apply to elections, but rather describes the process 
of policy making decision by representatives in a legislature. Therefore, 
in adopting these institutional restrictions in our voting game, we are 




























































































whose preferences exactly match the voters’ preferences. In section 5, 
we discuss alternative ways of aggregating individual preferences, either 
through a model of electoral competition -  probabilistic voting model -  
or through another post-election model -  agenda setter model -  and we 
compare the results.
The political system we adopt is characterized by the following 
arrangements11:
• Committee of the Whole: there exists only one committee, which 
coincides with the electorate, C  =  {£?};
• Simple Jurisdictions: each jurisdiction is a single dimension of the 
issue space, J =  {{r} , {cr}}. In other words, one jurisdiction has 
the power to deliberate on the income redistribution tax rate, r, 
and another one on the social security tax rate, a.
•  Every simple jurisdiction is assigned to the committee of whole, 
f  • E —* {{r} , {cr} }.
• Germaneness Amendment Control Rule: amendments to the pro­
posal are permitted only along the dimensions that fall in the ju­
risdiction of the committee. That is, if the proposal regards r, only 
amendments on r are permitted, and viceversa.
In this political system, the entire electorate has jurisdiction, i.e., 
it is entitled to make proposals, on the two issues; however, only sep­
arately, that is, issue by issue. As in Shepsle (1979), the adoption of 
simple jurisdictions and germaneness amendment rule converts our two- 
dimensional voting game into a simultaneous issue-by-issue voting game. 
This is needed to overcome the possible lack of a Condorcet winner of 
the two-dimensional majority voting game. No further restrictive juris­
dictional arrangements are imposed. The choice of a committee of the 
whole, for example, guarantees that no subset of the electorate which 
constitutes a committee is effectively awarded gate-keeping power over




























































































an issue. In fact, any such committee could block any alternative to the 
status quo which would be preferred by a majority of the electorate, but 
not by a majority of the members of this committee.
Since Shepsle (1979) [Theorem 4.1], we know that a sufficient con­
dition for the existence of an equilibrium in a voting game played under 
the institutional arrangements described above is that voters’ preferences 
are single peaked over the issue space, (r, <x) £ R2.
To establish single-peakedness for our voters’ preferences, it is useful 
to introduce some additional definitions12. We refer to the induced ideal 
point of a voter i in the j-th direction of the issue space (e.g., a) as the 
point that maximizes voter i ’ s indirect utility function along the j - th 
dimension (cr), while the other issue (r) is at its status quo value. An 
induced ideal point for voter i on a line in the issue space maximizes her 
utility function on this line with respect to both issues. Finally, we define 
preferences to be single-peaked over a line in the issue space as follows:
Definition 2 Let X  =  {x | x =  Xy +  (1 — A) z, y, z € (r, a ) , A € [0,1]} 
C (r, a) be the line connecting two arbitrary points y and z, in the issue 
space, (r, cr). Preferences are single peaked on X  if and only if, for all 
x € X  and x ^ x*1, u, [ax +  (1 — a) x*‘] > tq [fix +  (1 — /?) x*1] whenever 
0 <  a  < /3 < 1 and x" is the induced ideal point on X .
In other words, voter Vs preferences are single peaked over a line 
in the issue space if and only if, for any point on this line on one side 
of voter i ’s induced ideal point, points closer to the induced ideal point 
provide higher utility.
Recall that at time t the preferences of an ability type e< young 
voter over r(, and ot (=  cr(+1) are described by eq. 10; while old voters’ 
preferences are represented by eq. 11. Then we can state the following 
proposition.
Proposition 1 Over the issue space (r,cr) € R2, old voters’ preferences 
are single peaked; young voters’ preferences are single peaked over a line 
in the issue space if N  =  (1 -I- p.) /  (1 +  R) >  1/2.




























































































To prove single peakedness over a line in the issue space for young 
voters we show that N  > 1/2 is sufficient13 to guarantee that their utility 
function is quasi concave in (r, cr); then we apply Shepsle (1979) [Lemma 
3.1) to deduce single peakedness. For old voters, since their utility is not 
concave, we directly apply the definition of single peakedness to eq. 11. 
A formal proof is provided in the appendix.
The next proposition characterizes the structure induced equilib­
rium we use.
Proposition 2 Let X * be the set of j-th  components from the induced 
ideal points of all voters in the direction j  from the status quo x°. For one­
dimensional (simple) jurisdictions, a germaneness rule for amendments, 
a committee of the whole, and single peaked preferences, x° is a structure- 
induced equilibrium outcome if and only if, for all j , x° =  median X ) .
Proof: Since preferences are single peaked on any line in the issue 
space, if x° =  median X* then x° defeats all points along the y-th dimen­
sion, by Black’s median voter’s theorem. Given simple jurisdictions and 
germaneness rule, issues are voted once at a time; and since x° cannot be 
defeated by any point along any dimension j ,  then x° is a structure in­
duced equilibrium outcome, which proves sufficiency. Suppose now that 
x' is a structure induced equilibrium outcome, where x' ^  x° =  median 
X * Vj along some dimension i. Since we have a committee of the whole, 
then x' would always be defeated by x° along the i-th dimension, which 
proves the proposition.
Notice that the necessary condition established in this proposition 
relies on the use of a committee of the whole. In fact, if a jurisdiction were 
to be assigned to a committee which is a strict subset of the electorate, 
then along that jurisdiction the committee could use its gate-keeping 
power to force the electorate to choose on a restricted issue space and 
thus structure-induced equilibrium outcomes other than x° could arise.
13Since N  can be interpreted as the performance of the social security system 
relative to the saving (storage) technology, the sufficient condition, N  >  1/2, is not 
restrictive, since it only requires social security to yield at least half of the returns of 




























































































3.2 Subgam e Perfection  and Structure Indu ced  Equi­
libria
In this section, the assumption of commitment over future social security 
policies is dropped. Voters can only determine current tax rates, although 
they may expect their vote to condition future voters’ decisions. In this 
voting game with no commitment, we concentrate on a class of subgame 
perfect equilibria. Specifically, we introduce our equilibrium concept, 
that we call subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium, which re­
quires the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game without 
commitment to be structure induced equilibrium outcomes of the voting 
game with commitment.
In order to formalize our notion of equilibrium, we first define the 
voting game with no commitment.
The sequence of social security and income redistribution tax rates 
until t — 1 constitutes the public history of the game at time f, ht — 
{(t0, &o) i •••! (t«-i , crf_i)} 6 Ht, where Ht is the set of all possible history 
at time t.
An action for a type e young individual at time t is a pair of tax 
rates, ayte =  (r, a) G T, where
T =  |(r , a) : r  G [0,1] ,a  € [0,1] ,r  +  a  <  1 -  1/Ze} .
Analogously, an action for a type e old individual at time t is a°e =  
(t, a) G T. We call at the action profile of all individuals (young and 
old) at time t: at =  (ay U a°) where af = U ayt e and a° =  U a°e.
e€[e,e] ’ e€[e,e] ’
For a type e young individual a strategy at time t is a mapping 
from the history of the game into the action space: sf e : ht —> T, and 
analogously for a type e old individual at time t: s°e : ht —> T. The 
strategy profile played by all individuals at time t is denoted by st = 
(s? U s?) where syt =  U s\<e and s°t =  U s°
c^l£»eJ e€le,e]
At time t, for a given action profile, at, the pair (rtm, a represents 




























































































outcome function of the voting game at time t. This outcome function 
corresponds to the structure induced equilibrium outcome of the voting 
game with commitment, according to Proposition 2. The history of the 
game is updated according to the outcome function; at time f +  1: ht+i =  
{(r0i °o) i (Tt-ii o"t-i) i (t™, ct™)} € Ht+i.
For every agent, the payoff function corresponds to her indirect util­
ity. Formally, for a given sequence of action profiles, (oo,..., at, at+i, ...), 
and of corresponding realizations, ((to, <To). •••> (Tt! ^ t). (^t+ii o't+i), •••)> 
the payoff function for a type e young individual at time t is v\(rt, cr(, rt+1, 
<7(+i,e), as defined in eq. 10, and for a type e old agent is v\~l (rt,cr(,e), 
according to eq. 11.
Let =  s<7s“~ be the strategy profile at time t for all young 
individuals except for type e, and let s°|~ =  s°/s°~be the strategy profile 
at time t for all old individuals except for the type e. Then, at time t, a 
type e young individual maximizes
K,? ( s t |ê ’ s c? ) ’ s * ’ St+1’ " )  ~ v t { j t  ’ a t i rt+ li ^t+li
and a type ê  old individual maximizes
vl f 1 (̂ S0,..., , s f ,s t+i,...^ =  Ut‘_1 (rtm,CT(m,e)
where, according to our previous definition of the outcome function, 
(r(m,crtm) and (t™ ! , are, respectively, the medians among the ac­
tions over the two welfare programs tax rates played at time t and t +  1.
As previously argued, to deal with the two-dimensionality of the 
issue space, and to allow for intergenerational implicit contracts to arise, 
our equilibrium concept combines subgame perfection with the notion 
of structure induced equilibrium. We can now define a subgame perfect 
structure induced equilibrium of the voting game as follows:
Definition 3 (SPSIE) A voting strategy profile s =  {(sf U s°)}^ 0 is a 





























































































• s is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
• At every time t, the equilibrium outcome associated to s is a Struc­
ture Induced Equilibrium of the static game with commitment.
4 P olitico-E con om ic Equilibria
In this section, we study the subgame perfect structure induced equilib­
rium (SPSIE) outcomes of the voting game, to determine the size and the 
composition of the welfare state, (r,er). We do this in two steps. First, 
the structure induced equilibrium (SIE) outcome of the static voting 
game with commitment over the social security policy is characterized in 
Proposition 4.1. We, then, relax this assumption, and study the SPSIE 
outcome of the game with no commitment in Proposition 4.2.
In particular, in the next two sections we calculate the median 
among the induced ideal points of all voters over the two issues, r and er, 
in the voting game with commitment. In other words, we first calculate 
every elector’s ideal over the income redistribution tax rate for every 
given social security tax r(er), and then over the current and future 
social security tax rate for every given income redistribution tax rate 
<t (t). For each er we identify the median ideal for r. For each r we 
identify the median ideal for er. These median functions intersect at 
(r*, er*), which by Proposition 3.3 is a structure induced equilibrium.
4.1 V oting on th e Incom e R edistribution  Tax R ate
A quick look at eq. 11 reveals that old generations oppose any income 
redistribution transfer schemes, since, due to the distortionary taxation, 
they reduce the average income in the economy, and thus decrease their 
pension benefits, while they do not provide the old with any transfer. In 
fact, the maximization of eq. 11 with respect to r yields t‘1(1 =  0 for any 
positive value14 of er.
14For a — 0 the old’s indirect utility does not depend on r. Since the old are 




























































































Young generations, on the other hand, may benefit from this in- 
tragenerational transfer scheme, depending on their ability and on the 
resulting income. For a given social security tax rate, at (=  <7(+1) ,  an 
ability type et young at time t would choose her most preferred income 
redistribution tax rate r*t (cr) by maximizing her indirect utility in eq. 
10 with respect to r(. The first order condition of this problem yields:
(e* -  et)I  -
n
(1 -  r, -  atf
=  0.
And thus the optimal income redistribution tax rate, for a given a, is
Te,I (tT) =  max s 0, 1 — <7( +
1 — \J 1 +  4 (e  ̂— et) I (1 — at) 
2 (e  ̂— et)l
( 12)
Unsurprisingly, the young’s most preferred income redistribution 
tax rate is decreasing in their income. Above average income type would 
vote for r* =  0, together with the old. Poor, i.e., below average income, 
et < e<£, young vote for positive tax rates.
When voting on the income redistribution tax rate, r (a), agents 
can thus be ordered according to their age and income, as shown at 
figure 2a. Since the old generation represents a minority of the total 
electorate15, the median voter on the income redistribution tax rate, 
hereby intragenerational median voter, is the type-mr young agent, who 
divides the electorate in halves, i.e., such that
G (emT)
2 +  n
2(1 +  n)
(13)
Finally, if the median voter’s ability is below the average ability, 
emr < e<p, then t^t (ct) > 0, according to 12.
15Even if we adjust for voting participation rates, retirees are still a minority, al­




























































































4.2 V oting on th e  Social Security Tax R ate
The old have again a simple choice. Since they are no longer required 
to contribute to the system, they vote for the social security tax rate 
that maximizes their current transfer, see eq. 11. For a given income 
redistribution tax rate, r, the first order condition of their optimization 
problem is
e<t>n (e«) =  ---------5-----T? (14)
(1 -  Tt ~  0 t )
where n (ê ,) represents the average labor supply in the economy, see eq. 
4. Their most preferred social security tax rate is thus:
K id  (T ) =  1 “  Tt (15)
Because of the assumption of commitment over social security poli­
cies, the voting decision of an ability type et young individual amounts 
to maximizing her indirect utility, eq. 10, with respect to the current 
and future social security tax rate: at =  at+i =  <r, and for given values of 
the current and future income redistribution tax rates, r( and r(+1. The 
first order condition yields:
etn {et) 9Tt ^
da 1 +  R (16)
We impose rt =  rt+1 =  r to restrict our analysis to steady states. 
Eq. 16 can then be rewritten as
. .  . . . , t  +  N a
Ne^n (e#) — etn (et) = —-------------- - 5  (17)
(1 T  — a )
where N  =  (l +  ^ ) / ( l  +  /?) can be interpreted as the performance of the 
social security system relative to the saving (storage) technology. The 
optimal social security tax rate for a young type e(, given the income 
redistribution tax rate, r, is then
K,t (r ) =  max { 0.1 — T +
1 -  yjl +  47 (N  +  r (1 -  N)) (e07V -  et) '





























































































This optimal tax rate, ct*( (t), is clearly decreasing in the young 
income type, e(, because of the within-cohort income redistribution that 
this scheme achieves through a combination of a proportional income 
tax, a, and a lump sum old age transfer, P. In particular, for sufficiently 
small values of the income redistribution tax rate, r <  (1 — N) /  (2 — N), 
only those voters whose pre-tax labor income is below a fraction N  of 
the pre-tax average labor income in the economy, etn (et) < Ne^n (e^) 
(with N < 1), will vote for a positive social security tax; whereas richer 
young will oppose the scheme.
A look at equations 14 and 17 reveals that the old always vote 
for a larger social security tax than the poorest young, and, therefore, 
than any young. In fact, unlike the young, the old do not make any 
contribution to the system. Voters’ preferences over social security can 
easily be ordered according to age, and income, as depicted at figure 2b. 
The median voter on the social security tax rate is the type-mu young 
who divides the electorate in halves:
(̂ mcr) —
2 (1 +  A4)
(19)
In other words, the median in the distribution of actions played by old 
and young voters is u* (r) =  cr*( (r) with e( =  ema.
4.3 T he Equilibria
In sections 4.1 and 4.2, we analyzed the voters’ decisions over the two 
welfare schemes: we determined the decisive or median voter for each 
issue, emT and erna, and we calculated their most preferred tax rates, 
T r’nT (a) and o ’jn(7 (r). Equations 12 and 18 can indeed be interpreted as 
reaction functions: for a given value of the social security (income re­
distribution) tax rate, eq. 12 (18) pins down the income redistribution 
(social security) tax rate chosen by the median voter emT (e ^ ) . There­
fore, by Proposition 3.3 the (structure-induced) equilibrium outcomes of 
this voting game correspond to the points where these functions cross.
It is now useful to introduce a measure of the relative ability of 




























































































Act =  (Ne# — erna) l. Notice that, while AT simply measures the dif­
ference between the average labor income in the economy and the in- 
tragenerational median voter’s labor income, what is relevant in A a is 
the difference between the average ability in the economy weighted by 
the relative performance of the social security system, N, and the social 
security median voter’s ability. This is to take into account that social 
security is an inferior redistributive scheme for the young, due to its ineffi­
ciency in transferring resources into the future. Finally, let A be equal to 
At (1 — N) — Aa, and AT to AT — (1 — N ) ( l  -F i / l  +  4AT) /2. The next 
proposition characterizes the structure-induced equilibrium outcome of 
the voting game with commitment.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique structure-induced equilibrium of 
the voting game with commitment over the social security policies, with 
outcome (r*,cr*), such that
(I) if At < 0 and A a < — (1 — N), then r* =  0 and a" =  0;
(II) if At < 0 and A^ > — (1 — N), then t* = 0 and a" — 1 4-
1-V 1+4JVA,, 0.OA ^
(III) if AT > 0 and Aa < ÂT, then r* = 1 +  -1—' > 0 and er* = 0;
(IV) if Ar > 0 and Aa > ÂT, then
A proof is provided in the appendix. This proposition links the 
relative ability of the two median voters to the equilibrium welfare state. 
For sufficiently low levels of income inequality, case I, in equilibrium 
there are no welfare programs. In case II, the intragenerational median 
voter’s ability is above the mean ability, while the social security me­






























































































system is adopted. This case may arise in an economy with moderate 
overall income inequality and a large proportion of old voters, or in an 
economy where the high degree of labor income inequality is mainly due 
to a large share of retirees. Case III, on the other hand, presents a dis­
tribution of income with large inequality in the intragenerational voting, 
but only small inequality in the social security voting, and thus leads to 
an equilibrium with income redistribution transfers only. This case may 
correspond to a young, highly unequal society. Finally, for sufficiently 
high income inequality, case IV, the equilibrium outcome corresponds to 
a complete welfare state. Figure 3 illustrates the reaction functions and 
the equilibrium in case IV, when both systems arise.
This proposition suggests that to fully appreciate the relation be­
tween a welfare system and the labor income inequality in the economy, 
we need to analyze the underlining income distribution by age groups, 
since age, rather than income, may be the main determinant in some 
agents’ voting decision. Therefore, the overall income distribution needs 
to be separated in age groups and than recomposed, as shown in Figures 
2a and 2b, to take account of the income inequality as well as of the age.
We can now generalized the results obtained at proposition 4.1 to 
the voting game with no commitment:
Proposition 4 Every pair (t * which constitutes a structure induced 
equilibrium outcome of the voting game with commitment over the social 
security policies, is a subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium out­
come of the game with no commitment.
The idea of the proof, which is provided in the appendix, is very 
simple. It is easy to see that old agents support social security, and poor 
young support income redistribution. Moreover, low ability young indi­
vidual, who would vote for a positive social security level in the game with 
commitment, will also be willing to enter an implicit contract among suc­
cessive generations of voters to sustain social security. To illustrate this 
point, consider the structure induced equilibrium at case IV in Propo­




























































































very low ability type young would prefer more income redistribution, 
r' > t*, and less social security, a' < cr*, since the former is an inefficient 
redistributive program. However, even if they could affect the voting 
outcome16, it is easy to see that they would not be able to change it 
in the desired direction. In fact, any individual, whose ability is below 
the median voter’s ability, could decrease a tax rate (or both), by voting 
a — 0 or r =  0 (or a =  r =  0), and thus reducing the median tax 
rate. However, she would not be able to increase the median tax rate, 
since she is already voting a tax rate larger than the median (voter’s) tax 
rate. A similar reasoning applies to the other voters, and to all cases in 
Proposition 4.1.
4.3.1 An Exam ple o f Welfare System
To obtain a flavor of the result, we parameterize our simple model to 
the US economy. Every period corresponds to 25 years. The returns 
on social security are measured by the product of the real wage growth 
factor and the population growth factor. We set the annual real wage 
growth rate and the annual population growth rate respectively equal to 
2% and 1.5% to match respectively the growth rates of output per hours 
worked, and of the labor force in the last forty years. The performance of 
the other saving schemes is indicated by the real rate of return over the 
same period, which we set equal to 6.4%, according to the average real 
return from the S&P Composite over the last hundred years. It follows 
that the performance of the social security system relative to other saving 
schemes, N, is equal to 0.5, which indicates that social security pays out, 
on average, 50% less than private savings over the lifecycle.
The degree of income inequality is summarized by the relative abil­
ity of the two median voters, emT and ema. We rank the voters according 
to their ability and age, as in figures 2a and 2b, and then we use the 
1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data on earning inequality, 
and the 1992 Presidential election participation rates by age and income, 
to calculate the ratio of the intragenerational and the social security me­




























































































dian voter ability to the mean ability17. They turn out to be respectively 
emr/e« =  0.99 and em<7/e,<, — 0.66. The mean ability in the economy, 
is normalized to 1. The total amount of disposable time, Z, is set 
equal to 2.87 in order for the average (daily) working time to equal 8/14. 
The relative ability of the two median voters are thus Ar =  0.0287 >  0 
and Aff =  -0 .459  2 (>  ÂT =  —0.48526), additionally A =  0.473. Ac­
cording to Proposition 4.1, this situation corresponds to case IV, and 
the associated equilibrium welfare system should thus be composed of 
positive income redistribution and social security tax rates. In fact, they 
turn out to be respectively r* =  0.019 and a * =  0.168, which imply a to­
tal expenditure in direct income redistribution transfers equal to 11.3% 
of the total social security expenditure. These results are in line with 
the US welfare system, since the (employee-employer) social security tax 
rate is 14.4%, and, as shown in table 1, in 1992 the income redistribu­
tion transfers (i.e., public assistance and SSI) constituted 10.8% of the 
transfers to the old.
4.4 E quilibrium  Tax R ates and Incom e Inequality
In this section we concentrate on a welfare system composed of both in­
come redistribution and social security schemes, the most frequent situa­
tion, and analyze the effects of changes in income inequality on the equi­
librium tax rates. Simple comparative statics show that ceteris paribus 
an increase in the ability of the intragenerational median voter shifts up 
the associated reaction function, r'nT (a), and thus increases the equilib­
rium income redistribution tax rate while decreasing the social security 
tax rate. Analogously, an increase in the social security median voter’s 
ability or in the relative performance of the social security system as sav­
ing scheme, N, shifts up the other reaction function, o'ria (r), increases 
the social security tax rate, and reduces the income redistribution one.
These results, however, are not sufficient to characterize how a 
change in labor income inequality would affect the equilibrium tax rates.
17See the appendix B for a description of the data and of the procedure to calculate 




























































































An increase, for example, in inequality would presumably tend to de­
crease both median voters abilities with respect to the mean ability in 
the economy, i.e., AT and Aa would increase, and thus would shift both 
reaction functions in the same direction. The analysis of the consequences 
on the equilibrium tax rates of such changes represents the object of the 
next proposition.
First, we decompose the changes in the equilibrium tax rates into 
the effects due to the variation in the intragenerational median voter’s 
ability (dAT) and in the social security median voter’s ability (dAa):
d r*
da*
dr* d r '
d A T d A r + d A a
d A a
(+ ) (- )
d a * da*
d A T d A r + d A a
d A a
( - ) (+)
( 21)
As previously noted, the direct effect of a change in the median voter’s 
relative ability is positive, whereas the crossed effects are negative. The 
following lemma18  establishes another useful result.
Lemma 5 For an interior solution of the voting game, (r* >  0,<r* > 0),
dr* d a *
d A a d A a
The absolute value of the direct effect of a change in the social secu­
rity median voter’s ability is larger than the absolute value of the indirect 
effect. Finally, let =  9^7 7 ? be the elasticity of the equilibrium
income redistribution tax rate to changes in Aa, and r}a- &a =  
be the elasticity of the equilibrium social security tax rate to changes in 
A a. We can now state the following proposition, which we prove in the 
appendix:
Proposition 6  For an interior equilibrium of the voting game and for 
positive changes of AT and A a (dAT > 0, dAa > 0), the following holds:




























































































i) d r* > 0  and da* < 0  if | £ J £ - +  (i - N ) %no'.A,, ' '<
ii) dr* >  0  and da" >  0 if
i +  ( ! - * ) &  .
T * /g *
V,Aff +  ( 1 ~ ^ )
AT
Aff
^ I dAcr/Acy I <̂ 
-  | dAT/Ar | -
lii) dr* <  0  and da* > 0  i / | ^ / A . | ^ + (1
In other words, if the increase in income inequality induces a per­
centage increase in the measure A a of the social security median voter’s 
ability which is sufficiently smaller than the percentage increase induced 
in Ar (case i), then the income redistribution tax rate will increase and 
the social security tax rate will decrease. The opposite happens for per­
centage increases in Aa sufficiently larger than A T (case iii). For changes 
in Aa and A T of comparable magnitude (case ii), both tax rates in­
crease. A numerical example will help to appreciate the magnitudes of 
the changes in A a and Ar which lead to the three cases.
Exam ple 4.5: We use the values of the equilibrium welfare system 
we parametrized to the US economy in the previous section. The changes 
in the tax rates can be decomposed as at eq. 2 1 , and evaluated at 
r* =  0.019 and a * =  0.168:
d r* =  0.728 * dAT — 0.134 * dA„ 
da* =  —2.165 * dAT -I- 3.008 * dAa.
Therefore, an increase in the social security tax rate associated with a 
decrease in the income redistribution tax rate, case (iii), occurs when the 
percentage change in the social security median voter’s relative ability is 
larger than 33.9% of the corresponding change in the intragenerational 
median voter’s relative ability, | j^r/Ar | — 0-339. Case (i), d r* > 0 and 
da* < 0, occurs for | Ât/At | — 0-045, whereas case (ii), dr* >  0 and 




























































































5 D iscu ssion  o f th e  R esu lts
The idea that a social security system may rely on the political support of 
low-income young and retirees was first formulated by Tabellini (1990). 
In his overlapping generation model, heterogeneous (in income), weakly 
altruistic agents1 9  vote every period on the social security level. Young 
voters do not expect their decision to influence future policy outcomes. 
Nevertheless, because of their weak altruism, low-income young support 
social security, since the utility associated to their parents receiving a 
pension is larger than the direct (utility) cost of the tax. With suffi­
cient income inequality, an equilibrium with social security arises. This 
equilibrium, however, is not robust to changes in the specification of 
the welfare system. In particular, if a fiscal policy that achieves income 
redistribution within cohorts is introduced, the equilibrium disappears.
Our paper generalizes this result to a more complete welfare sys­
tem. In our model, social security may co-exist with an income redistri­
bution program in the political equilibrium of a two-dimensional voting 
game. The intuition is straightforward. Due to the existence of a within- 
generation redistribution component in the social security system, low in­
come young are willing to support both welfare schemes, although they 
would prefer pure income redistribution to social security. For the re­
tirees, on the other hand, age represents the main determinant in their 
voting decision. They contribute their voting block to promote social 
security and to prevent intragenerational income redistribution schemes 
from being adopted. Therefore, they help to shape the two winning ma­
jorities. On social security, the majority is composed of retirees and poor 
young, and the decisive, or median, voter is a low income young, see 
Figure 2.b; whereas on income redistribution the decisive, or median, 
voter is a young agent with a higher labor income, see Figure 2.a. In 
this sense, the retirees’ uniform voting behavior contributes to create a 
wedge between the abilities of the two decisive voters, which is crucial 
to obtaining an equilibrium welfare system composed of both schemes.
19Young altruism is towards their parents is weak, since they are not willing to give 




























































































The same intuition applies to the analysis of the effects of a change in 
the overall labor income distribution on the equilibrium tax rates. The 
final result depends on the impact that the change in income inequality 
has on the wedge between the two decisive voters, as characterized in 
Proposition 4.4.
Our results are robust to changes in the specification of the wel­
fare state and of the voting game. Consider a comprehensive income 
redistribution program, which imposes a proportional tax on all incomes 
(earnings, transfers, and pensions) and pays a lump sum transfer to all 
agents (young and old). Unlike in the previous specification, the retirees 
would now support positive levels of income redistribution, provided that 
the social security tax rate is sufficiently small. In fact, the smaller are 
their pensions, the smaller is their tax bill, and the total distortion in­
duced by the income redistribution tax rate on their pensions. Although 
this problem has no closed-form solution, it is straightforward to show 
that, if we parametrize the economy as in the example 4.3.1, there still 
exists an equilibrium welfare system20 with positive values of income re­
distribution, r* =  0.07, and social security tax rates, cr* =  0.09.
Would the results change if we adopt a political structure which 
induces sequential voting? Again, the answer is no. Suppose that elec­
tions take place in two rounds. Agents first determine the social security 
tax rate, cr, and then the income redistribution tax rate, r. In the first 
round, voters realize that their decision over cr has a negative effect over 
r, because a larger social security system crowds out the level of income 
redistribution. Since the median voter over cr is a low-income young, 
she favors a large income redistribution program. Thus, she will vote for 
a low cr, not to jeopardize the future decision over r. Graphically, her 
reaction function a  (r) is closer to the origin than in the issue-by-issue 
(simultaneous) voting (see Figure 3). An analog of Proposition 4.1 can 
thus be derived to provide the conditions under which a welfare state
20Notice that for this parametrization, there also exist two other equilibria of the 
game, one with zero income redistribution and positive social security: r* =  0, o ' = 
0.25; and the other with positive income redistribution and no social security: r* =  




























































































composed of both programs represents a politico-economic equilibrium 
of this sequential voting21.
In an independent contribution, Lambertini and Azariadis (1998) 
analyze a welfare system, composed of intragenerational and intergener- 
ational transfers, to account for the rapid expansion in the government 
redistributive expenditure of the last decades. Although their work fo­
cuses on similar aspects, their results differs from ours in at least two ma­
jor respects. In their politico-economic equilibrium, both programs are 
supported by the same voting majority composed of low-ability young 
and retirees. As a consequence, since we identify a different political 
support for the income redistribution program, also the implications of 
an increase in income inequality on the size of the welfare programs are 
different. In Lambertini and Azariadis (1998), the traditional implica­
tion holds, and the size of both programs rises. Our insight is that this 
is not necessarily true as age, rather than income, may be the crucial 
component in agents’ decisions.
Another difference with Lambertini and Azariadis (1998) lies in the 
political game. Their post-electoral political system follows Baron and 
Ferejohn’s (1989) legislative bargaining model with closed amendments 
rule. One of the three existing groups (old, skilled and unskilled young) 
is randomly chosen to be the agenda setter, and thus to make a policy 
proposal, which is then voted against the status quo at simple majority. 
Depending on the status quo, different agenda setters will form different 
minimum winning coalitions, and thus give raise to different compositions 
of the welfare state. They calibrate their model to the 1996 US economy 
and suggests that, when the unskilled young are selected to propose a 
policy, they enter a coalition with the old to support an equilibrium with 
positive intragenerational and intergenerational transfers.
An alternative way of aggregating individual preferences when the 
issue space is multidimensional is through a model of electoral competi­
21A numerical example parametrized to the US economy as in the previous sec­
tion provides qualitatively similar results. The equilibrium social security tax rate is 
12.3%, as opposed to 16.8% in the simultaneous issue-by-issue voting, and the income 




























































































tion, the probabilistic voting model22. In this pre-electoral voting model, 
candidates commit to an electoral program, which in our setting cor­
responds to a pair of tax rates (r, cr). Voters care about the indirect 
utility associated to these electoral platforms. Additionally, they have 
idiosyncratic ideological preferences over the candidates. This individ­
ual ideology is distributed according to a distribution function, which 
may vary across group of individuals, such as low or high ability young, 
and old. On average, individuals are ideologically neutral. Candidates 
choose their platforms, which in equilibrium turn out to be identical, to 
maximize the expected probability of being elected.
It is easy to see that, if all groups share the same degree of ide­
ology, i.e., the distributions are identical across groups, the candidates’ 
optimization problem coincides with maximizing a utilitarian utility func­
tion. In our setting, the corresponding politico-economic equilibrium 
would display no income redistribution and positive social security. To 
obtain an equilibrium welfare state with positive levels of both programs, 
we would need to assume that the low-income young are more ideolog­
ically homogeneous, i.e., their distribution is more concentrate around 
the mean, than, say, high ability young. In this case, the candidates 
would optimally place their (identical) programs closer to the ideal point 
of the low ability young, and would thus choose a positive level of income 
redistribution23.
6 C oncluding R em arks
Why does the largest US welfare program select its recipients by their 
age, rather than by their earnings or wealth? In contrast to previous 
literature, we suggest that a welfare system composed of a (large) PAYG 
social security program and an income redistribution scheme may repre­
sent the political equilibrium of a voting game played by successive gen­
22See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of all these voting models.
23Clearly, if the high ability young are more ideologically homogenous, the equilib­




























































































eration of voters. In particular, the social security system is supported 
by a majority of retirees and low-income young.
Two features are crucial to this result: the political power of the 
old, which derives from their “extreme” and uniform voting behavior; 
and the intragenerational redistribution component of the social security 
system. Unlike the young and the middle age, the elderly constitute 
a fairly homogeneous group. They are old, and they have zero (when 
retired) or low labor earnings, although they may largely differ in their 
wealth. This homogeneity makes them a uniform electoral block when 
voting on redistribution issues: they all like social security, and they all 
may or may not support different forms of income-based redistribution. 
Since they are able to cluster and shift a large amount of votes, the 
elderly play a crucial role in shaping the two winning coalitions, as shown 
in Figure 2.
The existence of a within generation redistribution element in the 
social security system, on the other hand, induces low-income young to 
support the social security, even in the presence of other income redis­
tribution schemes. This factor has often been overlooked by the social 
security literature. Its relevance for the political viability of a system 
is, however, crucial, as recent social security reforms have shown. In 
fact, most reformed systems have maintained an element of within gen­
erational redistribution, sometimes as a new, separate program financed 
through general taxation.
The common wisdom in the politico-economic literature has been 
that income inequality is positively related to government welfare trans­
fers. The empirical evidence are, however, mixed. Tabellini (1990) and 
Perotti (1996) has provided evidence in support of a negative and sig­
nificant relation between a joint measure of welfare and social security 
transfers, and income inequality. In Lindert (1997), higher inequality de­
creases all social expenditures24. We argue that the effect on each indi­
24Tabellini measures income inequality by the ratio between the pre-tax income 
received by the top 20% and by the bottom 40% of the population. Perotti uses share 
of income in the third and forth quintile. Lindert identifies inequality as the sum of 




























































































vidual welfare program depends not only on the magnitude of the change 
in income inequality, but also on its specific impact on the income distri­
bution. In particular, our model suggests that, when analyzing pension 
transfers, the overall income distribution should be decomposed by age 
groups. This is because age, rather than labor income, may be the main 
component in the agents’ decisions. Only then, should a measure of in­
equality be constructed according to income and age, as shown in figure 
2 .
Unfortunately, data availability on measures of labor income in­
equality by age group is very limited. The International Labor Office 
(ILO) provides one observation, in the mid 80s, of few measures of labor 
income dispersion for people aged 25 to 54, and for the overall population 
in 15 OECD countries. In the appendix, we use these few observations 
to relate the expenditures in old age pension and income redistribution 
to the explanatory variables suggested by our model. Interestingly, we 
find that old age pensions are strongly positively correlated to the share 
of elderly (aged 60+) in the population, and to a measure of the rela­
tive performance of the pension system, N. After controlling for these 
effects25, in our 15 observations, the correlation between old age pensions 
and different measures of income inequality is always very weak. How­
ever, this correlation increases, and delivers the expected sign, when, as 
suggested by our theory, we move from a measure of after tax overall in­
come inequality to a measure of pre-tax income inequality among people 
aged 25 to 54. We find this encouraging. As more data on labor income 
dispersion by age group become available, we believe that these simple 
considerations should be taken into account in future empirical studies.
upper income gap is the ratio of the average income for the top fifth to that for the 
third fifth. The lower income gap is the comparable measure between the third and 
the fifth quintiles.
25Income redistribution transfers turn out to be strongly positively correlated to 
the share of elderly (aged 65+) in the population, and negatively to different measures 





























































































1992 Cash Benefits in billions of $
OASDHI 284.3
Railroad Ret. 7.3














Railroad Ret. 58.2 45.1
Public Employees Ret. 7.7 -
Veterans’ Pensions 16.5 -
Unemployment Benef. 9.9 31.2
Workers Comp 3.2 40.9

































































































Participation Rates by Income
18-64 Year Old Voting Population
Income (7) 1992
I < $5, 000 30.4 %
$5,000 < I <  $9,999 34.5 %
$10,000 < 7 < $14,999 40.1 %
$15,000 < I  < $19,999 50.6 %
$20,000 < I < $24,999 59.8 %
$25,000 < 7 < $34,999 68.4 %
$35,000 < 7 < $49,999 75.6 %
$50,000 < 7 79.7 %
Income not Reported 54.9 %




























































































A  A p p en d ix
The Political System: Our political system describes a decision-making 
institution which has 1 +  1/(1 +  /x) members: the electorate, E. The 
space of alternatives is a compact subset of 5R2: (r, o) s.t. r  +  a  <  1. 
And there exists a complete, transitive binary preference relation > over
t
all alternatives x ,y  6  5ft2, Vi € E, and represented by vt : 5R2 —> 5?. 
Institutional arrangements differ along three dimensions: (a) committee 
structure; (b) jurisdiction structure; and (c) amendment structure. The 
first two structures follow from the definitions below.
Definition 4 (C om m ittee) Call the family of sets C  =  {Cj }  a com­
mittee system if it covers the entire electorate E. Then the committee 
C = {E } is the Committee of the Whole.
Definition 5 (Jurisdiction) Let B =  {&i,&2} t>e the orthogonal basis 
for 5ft2 where bi is the unit vector for the i-th dimension. The family 
of set J  =  {Jk} is a jurisdictional arrangement if it covers B. Then 
J =  {{&i} , {6 2}} is a Simple Jurisdiction.
Additionally, call /  the function which associate a jurisdiction with 
a committee, /  : C —> Jk. In our system /  : E  —» {{£>1 } ,  {6 2 }} or 
f ( E )  =  {{b1} , { b 2}}.
To define an amendment structure we need to introduce the notions 
of status quo, x°, and of proposal. A status quo, x°, represents the 
previous agreed level on both dimensions of the issue space. For example, 
at time t, {xl,x°2} =  {Tt- i ,a t-i}-
Definition 6  (Proposal) A proposal, x, is a change in x° restricted to 
a single jurisdiction. The set of proposal available to the committee of 
the whole is




























































































Definition 7 (Am endm ent Control Rule) For any proposal x €g(E),  
the set M  (x) Ç 3ft2  consists of the modifications E may make in x. M  (x ) 
is said to be an amendment control rule. An amendment control rule is 
a Germaneness rule if M  (x) =  {x' \ x' =  x° if xx =  x°}.
Definition 8  (Induced Ideal Point) For a status quo x° =  (xf,x£) 
and a jurisdiction bj, the induced ideal point in the j-th  direction for 
i 6  E is x*‘ =  (x", x°_^ where x*' =  argmaxu* [xj,x°_^j. Then, x” is 
the induced ideal point on an arbitrary set X  if ux (x) is maximized on X  
at x =  x**.
Definition 9 (M edian in all D irections) In a two-dimensional issue 
space (r,cr), x =  ( f , a)is a median in all direction if any line passing 
through x divided the issue space in two areas each one containing half 
of the electorate’s ideal points.
Proof of Proposition 3.2 (I) Young voters’ preferences are represented 
by eq. 10. We derive eq. 10 with respect to rt and a  (=  at — <r(+1), 
and then we impose the stationarity condition r =  r( =  rt+i to 
obtain the following Hessian matrix:
l + T - C T  2 T
(1 - T - a )  (1 - r - a ) 3
2t  1 —3t —g —2 N + 2 N t
(l-r-<r)3 (l-T-g)â
Simple algebra shows that, if N >  (<  this ma­
trix is semi definite negative. Then young voters’ preferences are 
quasi concave and, by Shepsle (1979) Lemma 3.1, they are single 
peaked.
(II) Old voters preferences (eq. 11) are not concave in (r, tr), thus we 
will establish single peakedness using definition A.7. Let r  =  p+qa  
be a line in the issue space (t,<j ). By definition A.6 , the induced 
ideal point for old voters on this line is
=  p +




























































































for p < 1 , and (t* = 0 , cr* =  — for p > 1  and q <  — 1 (Clearly
for p > 1  and q > —1, then r +  a  > 1). By definition A.7, single
peakedness requires that
u [err' +  ( 1  — a) r*, aa' +  ( 1  — a) cr*] >  (2 2 )
u [Pt' +  (1 -  P) T*,Pa' +  (1 -  P) o *\,
V (r', a') s.t. t' =  p +  qa', whenever 0 <  a  < p  < 1. To verify eq. 
2 2 , we substitute the values of (r*, a*) into
u [err' +  ( 1  — q) t*, aa' +  ( 1  — a) cr*],
and then derive it with respect to. a. The sign of this derivative is 
equal to
( l + g ) a  (1 +  q) a(<r'-  a*) — 2. -ê l
(fjf _j_ e\ r ] 1-pU7  +  g) r  [l+;-a(l+4 )(f+ff')]*J
for p < — 1  
for p > — 1
This sign is negative in both cases for a < 1, which implies that 
the inequality at eq. 2 2  holds, and that old voters preference are 
single peaked.
P roof o f Proposition 4.1 Using equations 12 and 18, it is easy to show 
that these reaction functions cross only once in the simplex r  +  cr <  
1 at (r*,cr*). This is the only point which represents the median 
among the induced ideal point along both dimensions, r and cr, 
and thus by Proposition 3.3 (r*,cr*) is the only structure induced 
equilibrium.
If AT < 0 and A a <  — (1 — N),  the reaction functions 12 and 18 are 
only defined on the simplex r +  a <  1 at (r =  0, a =  0). If At < 0  
and Aa > — (1 — N),  then r^T (cr) =  0, and thus it crosses the reac­





























































































To find the condition for an interior solution, case iv, notice that for 
Ar >  0 both reaction functions are negatively sloped, and that 
t^t (a) has a higher intercept on the vertical, <r, axis than a ’̂  (r). 
Since both reaction functions are continuous, if (r) crosses the 
horizontal, r, axis to the right of r*lT (er) there exists a political equi­
librium of the voting game for r* =  AT ( l  — 2./VA — y/l  — AN A) /  
2 A 2  and ct* =  1 — N —r* (2 — N  — (ACT/A T)). The condition for the 
reaction function (r) to cross the horizontal axis to the right of 
r^T (cr) is that Aff > AT =  AT -  (1 -  N ) ( l  -I- -v/1 +  4AT) /2. If, on 
the other hand, ACT < AT, then <r^ (r) will cross the horizontal, r, 
axis to the left of r^T (cr), and thus the equilibrium will be on the 
horizontal, r, axis at r* =  1 +  ( l  — v l̂ +  4AT) /2A T.
P roof o f Proposition 4.2 Suppose (r*, cr*) is a structure induced equi­
librium outcome of the voting game with commitment over the so­
cial security policies. Let us define the following realization of the 
public history of the game:
H° =  { h t € Ht\a k =  0, k =  — 1}
and
Hf — { ht € Ht\ 3 to 6  {0 , 1 ,..., t — 1 } : cr( — 0 Vt < to 
and at =  cr Vt >  to}
notice that H? fl H f =  0.
Consider the following strategy s =  (s fe,s°e), for a type e young:
i) if e < em<7
<tys t,e
(rt,e (u*),<r*) if ht € H° U 
(rt,e (0 ) , 0 ) if ht €
ii) if e > e„
» t,e
(n,e (cr’) , (r*)) if
(T t ,e  (0 ) , 0 ) if
/i, € H° U H f 




























































































and for an old individual
Se,t =  (0 , (Told (r*)) if h t € H t
where at,ema (t *) is defined in eq. 1 2 ; rt emT (a*) in eq. 18, and 
Void (r*) in eq. 15.
Since by definition of SIE, a * =  (r*), r* =  rtiemT (cr*), it is
easy to see that:
Tt,e (a*) >  r* V e <  emT, 
fft.e (t*) >  cr* V e < em<T
Moreover, since the outcome function of the voting game at time f is 
the median in every dimension of the distribution of actions, (rtm,crj"), 
it is easy to see that the previous strategy profile constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the voting game with no commitment, 
with equilibrium outcome (r*,cr*).
P roof o f Lemma 4.3 Prom equation 20, =  ^ 7  —(2 — N  —
and d £  =  1 T* +  ^  ( X “  TT^va)- Since ( d r ' / d A a) <  0 and 
(da*/dAa) >  0, thus it is sufficient to show that — ( d r ' / d A a) <  
(da* / d A a), which can be done from the previous two expressions 
and using some simple algebra.
P roof o f Proposition 4.4 To prove part (iii), we use the decompo­
sition at eq. 2 1  to write dr* <  0  and da* >  
and(ft-yaAr)(dT'/0&„)
dA„/A„  >  (da'/dAr)
dAr/Ar —  (do-/dAa)'
> O a n d l^  =
0  as >dAr/Ar —
From equation 20, =
i - ( l  -  N) § £  0  and l f T  - £ - { l  - N ) $ £ <  0. Substitut­
ing these derivatives in the previous inequality we obtain:
+  ( 1  ~ N ) & and
I dAg/Ag  I 
I dAr/Ar I
I dAg / A a I 
I dAr/Ar I
do-,A,
Since by Lemma 3 .5 ,  |1 /»7 t*,a J  < |r*/cr* * Vo-,a„
and da* > 0  for I I >dAr/Ar \ — dr-,Ac +  (1 - N )
then dr* <  0  
which prove





























































































B A p p en d ix
In this appendix the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data are 
used to analyze some feature of the US income distribution. The data 
unambiguously show that earnings, income, and wealth are unequally 
distributed across US families. In particular, the density functions of 
these distributions are skewed, as they display a fat lower tail, many 
poor, and a thin upper tail, few rich. For example, the ratio of median 
to mean was equal to 0.60 for earnings, to 0.58 for income, and to 0.28 
for wealth. Other inequality indicators present the same picture.
Consider the ordering in the social security voting, as shown at 
figure 2b. The mass of retirees is placed on the left of the income dis­
tribution: they vote for a larger tax rate than the poorest young. When 
adjusted for the (1992 Presidential) election participation rates, they 
represent 19% of the actual voters. To account for the young voters, we 
drop the retirees (person older than 65 year) from the sample, and adjust 
the new earning distribution for the election participation rates. Since 
turnout rates are not available by earnings group, we need to combine 
earnings distribution data with the participation rates by income shown 
at table 3. Given the high correlation between income and earnings 
found on 1992 data by Diaz-Giménez, Quadrini, and Rios Rull (1997), 
who report a coefficient of 0.928, we assume that there are no permuta­
tions between the income and the earnings distributions. In other words, 
voters with low (high) earnings are associated to voters with low (high) 
income and to the corresponding participation rates. After the weights of 
the earnings distribution have been adjusted for the different participa­
tion rates, we obtain that the ratio of the social security median voter’s 
earnings to the mean earnings in the economy is equal to 0 .6 6 .
In the case of intragenerational redistribution the ordering of the 
voters is shown at figure 2a. The retirees now vote against the trans­
fer and are placed on the right of the income redistribution. Since in 
1992 almost 13% of the elderly would receive intragenerational trans­
fers, we subtract these individuals from the retirees and add them to the 




























































































ally received a benefits, they would presumably have voted in favor of 
this policy. This makes the proportion of elderly voters in the voting 
population drop to 16.5%. We then adjust the earning distribution to 
account for young voters only, as described above, and calculate the ra­
tio of the intragenerational redistribution median voter’s earnings to the 
mean earnings in the economy, which is equal to 0.99.
C A p p en d ix
In this appendix, we discuss the data, and the methodology we use to 
relate the expenditures in old age pension and income redistribution to 
the explanatory variables suggested by our model.
j,From an OECD (1995) report, we obtained ILO measures of labor 
income dispersion for people aged 25 to 54, and for the overall population 
in 15 OECD countries. The World Bank database described in Deininger 
and Squire (1996) provides measures of overall income inequality. The 
countries, and the years (first year ILO, second year WB) the data refer 
to are: Australia (1985-86, 1989), Belgium (1988, 1992), Canada (1987, 
1991), Finland (1987, 1991), France (1984, 1984), Germany (1984, 1984), 
Ireland (1987, 1987), Italy (1986, 1991), Luxembourg (1985, 1985), the 
Netherlands (1987, 1991), Norway (1979, 1991), Sweden (1987, 1990), 
Switzerland (1982, 1982), UK (1986, 1991), and US (1986, 1991). The 
ILO measures are the ratio of the labor income of the individual in the 
25 centile to the labor income of the median individual for people aged 
25 to 54, and for the overall population, which we denotes respectively 
as P25 and PT25. The WB measure we use is the ratio of the income 
share of individuals in the 2 nd quintile to the income share of individuals 
in the 4th quintile for the overall population: PT.
Data on the expenditures in old age pension and income redistri­
bution as percentage of the GDP are obtained from the OECD Social 
Expenditure Database. These are average over the 1980-96 period. In­
come redistribution transfer include family cash benefits, family service, 




























































































60+, and 65+) in the population are taken from World Bank data for 
the 1990. A measure of the relative performance of the pension system, 
N, represents our own calculation using Miles (1997) data on average 
real returns over 1962-94 and GNP real growth over 1961-94.
Column 2 of table C.l displays the results of a simple OLS regres­
sion of the ratio of the income redistribution to GNP over the share of 
elderly (aged 65+) in the population, Pop65, and over a measure of in­
come inequality, P T 25. Both regressors are significant at a 5% level. 
PT25 has the expected sign, more income inequality (lower PT25) leads 
to higher transfers. The positive sign of Pop65 suggests that elderly 
people do care about income redistribution programs as well.
In column 3, 4, and 5, we regress the ratio of the Old Age Pensions 
to GNP over the share of elderly (aged 60+) in the population, Pop60, 
over our measure of the relative performance of the pension system, N, 
and over a measure of income inequality, respectively PT, P T 25, and 
P25. Two regressors, Pop60 and N, have the expected sign, and are 
almost always significant at a 5% level. However, no measure of income 
inequality is significant. In fact, in column 3, where we use the measure 
of after tax overall income inequality, PT, even the sign is wrong. If, 
according to our theory we look at pre-tax income inequality among 
people aged 25 to 54, P 25 (column 5) the regressor is still not significant, 
but with the right sign. The results of the regression with P T 25 are 


































































































Const 3.300 -6.0394 -4.9367 -3.5107
(2.7518) (3.2394) (3.9177) (1.4943)
Pop60 .4362* .4778* .4953*
(.1682) (.1599) (.1627)









R 2 50.25% 64.27% 63.08% 63.72%
N.obs. 15 15 15 15
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